

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

8 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ken deGraffenreid
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Answers to Senator Helms' Letters

1. Attached are the answers to Senator Helms' letters of April 25th and October 2nd. The Director has reviewed and approved them. [redacted]

25X1

2. As you can see, the Director is prepared to send these materials to Senator Helms directly, and his proposed covering letter is attached. If Bud would prefer to forward the materials with a letter along the lines of the DCI's, Bill would defer in light of the fact that the letters were to the President. [redacted]

25X1

3. After all this time, however, he is eager to move quickly with the package. If Bud prefers that the DCI sign the letter, we would hope to hear back from you with any comments Tuesday (or Wednesday at the latest). I know that this is short notice but now that the package is complete, the DCI simply wants to get it to the Senator as quickly as possible. [redacted]

25X1

4. Our proposal is that, regardless whether Bud or Bill signs the letter, copies of the package would go to the Secretaries of State and Defense; Director, ACDA; Chairman, PFIAB; the Chairman of the two Oversight Committees; and the other congressional signatories to the April 25 letter. [redacted]

25X1

5. Finally, I am having [redacted] the package a quick read to see if we can live with the classification at secret or whether it should be raised [redacted]

25X1


25X1

25X1


~~SECRET~~

25X1

Ken deGraffenreid
National Security Council

5. We have tried to prepare the answers as honestly as possible in terms of acknowledging shortcomings but there is also some very useful correcting of the record in these materials. On the whole, I think it is a pretty good package. 

25X¹
25X1



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As Stated

Page Denied



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

6 November 1985

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence



Attached is the final of the letter for Senator Helms and the answers to his questions.

Before sending this, I urge you to consult with Bud or John Poindexter and to show them the text of your covering letter inasmuch as you cite the President.

I also would encourage you to make arrangements to take this package to Senator Helms yourself, to go through it and talk with him about it. (You should not leave it with him, however, because of its classification.)

Finally, once you have either sent the package to Helms or met with him on it, I would recommend the further distribution of the package we have discussed -- the two Oversight Committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, Director, ACDA, Chairman, PFIAB, and the other congressional signatories of the April 25 letter.

The package has been coordinated with the DDCI, EXDIR, DO, DS&T, DA and D/OLL.



Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SECRET 

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

MASTE
D2

31 October 1985

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Response to Helms' Letters

1. The attached package consists of three parts:

- a forwarding letter from you to Bud McFarlane,
- a draft proposed forwarding letter from Bud to Senator Helms, and

[REDACTED]

25X1

2. The answers to the questions have been reviewed and coordinated with NIO/SP, C/ACIS, D/SOVA and D/OSWR. We have ignored the rhetoric and the nasty inferences in the questions and have hewed to strictly factual answers in a low key and straightforward manner. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

4. You may need to put some pressure on Bud to send his letter in the name of the President, but we all believe that that kind of vote of confidence in light of the severity of these allegations is needed. Indeed, as I told Ken deGraffenreid, the President, members of the National Security Council and the NSC Staff over the last couple of years have been very complimentary about the support they have gotten on Soviet strategy and arms control issues from the Intelligence Community and it is now time for them to stand up and be counted on the record. On the other hand, should Bud refuse, I would anticipate your signing a cover letter to Senator Helms and would recommend something like the proposed draft for Bud -- but only as a fallback. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

[REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET

5. Once the package is sent to Senator Helms, I believe we should send copies of the entire package also to the Chairmen of the two Oversight Committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of ACDA and the Chairman of PFIAB. I think that there is a great deal of useful information and correcting of the record in these answers. [redacted]

25X1

6. [redacted] we should show the answers to the April 25 letter to Ken Adelman before you actually send it to Bud. I have no objection to this if it involves [redacted] handcarrying the answers down, sitting with him while he reads them, and bringing them back here. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

7. This is an important package and I urge you to go through it carefully because given the past record you will undoubtedly see some of it in the newspaper. [redacted]

25X1

8. The DDCI has reviewed the entire package and supports it. [redacted]

25X1

Robert M. Gates

Attachments:
As Stated

SECRET

SECRET

MASTER

DE

29 October 1985

NOTE TO: DDCI
ADDI
D/SOVA
D/OSWR
C/ACIS
NIO/SP
NIO/USSR

25X1

1. Attached are draft responses to the questions in Senator Helms' two letters as well as proposed forwarding memoranda from the DCI to McFarlane and from McFarlane to Senator Helms.

2. The draft answers you prepared were very candid and I have preserved as much of your material as I thought appropriate and added my own. I suggest that the most efficient way to incorporate your comments would be for us to meet at 4:30 tomorrow afternoon (Wednesday, 30 October) to go through the material together.

25X1

25X1

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments:
As Stated

SECRET

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

25X1

SUBJECT: Senator Helms' Questions to the President

1. Attached are answers to the April 25 and October 2 letters from Senator Helms. I also attach a draft letter that I urge you to send to Senator Helms on the President's behalf.

2. We have attempted to provide as candid and honest answers as possible, including acknowledging areas in which there were shortcomings in the performance of the Intelligence Community.

25X1

3. Several points are worth highlighting:

- A number of allegations are made about CIA's performance on substantive issues. It is important to realize that while mistakes were made in assessing Soviet strategic forces at one time or another, they were almost always mistakes of the entire American Intelligence Community, including the intelligence components of the Department of Defense. To single out CIA is inaccurate and unjustified.
- Someone has passed the Senator a great deal of inaccurate information. We would be happy to brief the Senator in person on Soviet strategic matters should questions arise or should he learn of information of concern to him. It may be worth warning him that someone advising him may have ulterior motives aimed at discrediting CIA.
- CIA's work on a problem as complicated as the Soviet strategic issue is of necessity a team effort. No single individual merits sole credit or deserves specific blame and I, therefore, name no names in the answers.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

4. Finally, there is an issue that I must address on behalf of the men and women of this Agency. There is a clear and repeated inference in Senator Helms' letters of a "pro-Soviet" bias in CIA and, even worse, that a Soviet "mole" or "penetration" has influenced the outcome of the Agency's judgments over the past twenty years. No responsible DCI would ever claim that the Agency has not been penetrated, but even with the large number of defectors in recent years, we have acquired no evidence that would suggest any active penetration at any point in the past twenty years. Moreover, it is my judgment that where there have been shortcomings in the past, they have been due to a combination of inadequate leadership, failure to ask the proper questions, and a lack of analytical rigor. I say this because I have observed over the past five years that the analysts here, as a group, are extraordinarily talented, competent and tough minded people who, when well-led at all levels, consistently come through. [redacted]

25X1

5. The inference of disloyalty in the letters is unjustified and unfortunate. Too many CIA people have served in uniform, have laid down their own lives or have lost their sons in the service of this country for anyone to question their loyalty, dedication and devotion to this country -- even indirectly. We know that CIA is a principal target for Soviet penetration and we are constantly trying to improve our counterintelligence and our security. But in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I have absolute confidence in the loyalty of each and every CIA officer, past and present. [redacted]

25X1

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence